Japan tests China’s eastern flank
Asia Times, 17 July 2012
As tensions continue to swirl in the South China Sea, pressure is also building on China’s eastern flank. The recent escalation of a long-standing dispute between China and Japan over a group of islands highlights significant regional and global changes in the balance of power. Waves from the stormy waters between China and Japan are being felt throughout the world.
Both China and Japan claim the uninhabited Pinnacle Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese and Senkaku in Japanese). These islands are currently under Japanese control, but both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Taiwan-based Republic of China (ROC) dispute Japanese claims to the islands. The Japanese government “rents” the Pinnacles from a private citizen, and has
Dilbert
prevented landings on the islands in order to avoid a diplomatic crisis with China.
The intensification of the longstanding dispute can be traced back to April. Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara announced plans for the Tokyo metropolitan government to purchase the islands from their private titleholder. A fundraising campaign was launched to raise capital for the planned purchase, which brought in over US$16 million. This put Japan’s central government in the awkward position of dealing with a local government influencing an international dispute.
On June 8, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda weighed in on the issue with a call to “nationalize” the islands, telling his cabinet: “There is no question that the Senkakus are an integral part of our country’s territory…From the viewpoint of how to maintain and manage the Senkakus in a calm and stable manner, we are making comprehensive studies on the matter by keeping in touch with the owner…”. [1]
The Chinese government reacted with predictable outrage. An official complaint was lodged the same day as Noda’s speech. Foreign ministry spokesman Liu Weimin stated, “We cannot allow anyone to buy or sell China’s sacred territory.”[2] Chinese patrol vessels have neared the islands, initially refusing to leave after Japanese orders to vacate the area. This incident prompted Japan to summon the Chinese ambassador. The Chinese foreign ministry insisted the islands are Chinese territory, and “does not accept Japanese representations” over the issue.
The foreign ministers of China and Japan met on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Minister’s Meeting in Cambodia in order to discuss the issue, but neither side was willing to compromise claims of sovereignty.
On Wednesday, Japan described the entry of three Chinese vessels into Japanese-controlled waters near the Pinnacle Islands as “unacceptable”. Uichiro Nira, the Japanese ambassador to China was recalled to Tokyo during the weekend for high-level consultations with the central government. Nira has warned of the potential for an “extremely grave crisis” between the Asian giants.
Risky strategy
The timing of the ongoing row is particularly interesting. China has recently faced an intensification of maritime disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea. The Japanese government may be seeking to put pressure on Beijing at this juncture in order to make common cause with smaller Asian neighbors who are also troubled by China’s rapid expansion of economic and military clout.
Indeed, Japan has announced plans to host a special security summit with ASEAN next year. Although Japan holds meetings with ASEAN on an annual basis, this will be the first conference with a particularly focus on “maritime security”. [3] Clearly, Japan is trying to shore up allies in order to put joint pressure on Chinese territorial claims.
However, this strategy could be a mistake. China has consistently resisted calls to settle its disputes with rival claimants in the South China Sea on a multilateral basis. The Chinese government is well aware that it can exert greater influence on other countries using a bilateral approach. Furthermore, ASEAN itself is divided on the issues of South China Sea sovereignty.
Cambodia, a strong ally of China, is very reluctant to address the issue in an ASEAN versus China context. Thailand has expressed a desire for disputes in the South China Sea to not effect ASEAN cooperation with China. Furthermore, although Vietnam and the Philippines contest China’s claims of sovereignty in the area, they also contest each other’s.
The timing of Japanese moves to “nationalize” the Pinnacle Islands also comes at a crucial period for Japanese domestic politics. Noda recently enacted controversial policies such as restarting nuclear power plants and raising Japan’s sales tax. Former Democratic Party of Japan chief Ichiro Ozawa, nicknamed the “Shadow Shogun”, has abandoned the ruling DPJ in protest, bringing 48 parliamentarians with him into his new “People’s Life Comes First” party.
Noda may be hoping to shore up domestic support by playing the nationalist card. The Japanese public is highly wary of a rising China, which has recently overtaken Japan as the world’s second-largest economy and shares a troubled history with the island nation. Orchestrating a limited confrontation with China could be useful for Noda’s political ambitions.
It is important to note that Beijing did not initiate the current escalation. Although this maritime dispute is at least several decades old, Beijing has been content to diplomatically protest Japanese claims while accepting the status quo on the ground. The Japanese government has intensified the longstanding dispute for geo-strategic and political reasons, forcing China to react. Chinese political and military responses to the perceived Japanese provocation closely mirror recent Chinese strategies against Vietnamese claims in the South China Sea.
The motivation for both China and Japan to control the Pinnacle Islands comes less from the islands themselves, and more from the potential for commercial fishing, as well as oil and gas reserves in the area. Sovereignty over the islands would allow for exploration of these natural resources. China and Japan are highly dependent on imported energy, and the ability to tap reserves in the East China Sea would lessen reliance on oil and gas transported through the highly contested South China Sea.
However, the guaranteed drawbacks of open conflict would far outweigh the potential benefits of controlling the islands. China is Japan’s number one trading partner, and as the global economy continues to falter, the two nations need each other’s markets to stay afloat. The mutual benefit of trade and investment between the two nations far exceeds the value of oil, gas and fish in the region.
Japan’s regional ambitions are further restrained by her troubled history. The recent Japanese failure to reach a military pact with South Korea largely stemmed from the tragic historical legacy of Japanese colonialism. China may appear to some as belligerent in its disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam, but Japan will have a much harder time garnering regional sympathy in the unlikely event of military conflict.
Eagle eye on troubled waters
The United States is closely monitoring the political and diplomatic struggle over the Pinnacle Islands. Historically, US involvement in the area is extensive. The islands were occupied by the United States from the end of World War II until 1972, when they were “returned” to Japanese control. Both China and Taiwan dismissed this transfer of authority as a violation of Chinese sovereignty.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stopped in Japan on her way to the recent ASEAN meeting in Cambodia. She inquired about Japanese plans to “nationalize” the islands, with apparent concern for Sino-Japanese relations. She then met with the Chinese foreign minister at the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, with Clinton stressing that the US won’t “take sides in disputes about territorial or maritime boundaries”. [5]
This is a pointed change in tone from earlier that week, when a State Department official said that the US would be required to come to Japan’s aid in case of attack by a third party on the disputed Islands: “The Senkakus would fall within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security because the Senkaku Islands have been under the administrative control of the government of Japan since they were returned as part of the reversion of Okinawa in 1972,” said the unnamed official. [5]
Article Five of the 1960 US-Japan Treaty is essentially a mutual-defense clause. It is a cornerstone of US Asia policy, cementing the alliance between the US and Japan. However, its application in case of skirmishes over the Pinnacle Islands could lead to disastrous consequences.
The US neither wants to appear as an ineffective ally, nor to risk World War III over a small maritime clash. Clinton’s efforts to reach out to the Japanese and Chinese governments, as well as her claims that the US does not favor one territorial claimant over another, are part of a concerted effort to disuse a potential powder keg.
China is wary of American intentions in the region, especially given the US “strategic pivot” towards Asia. Any attempts by the US to openly back Japan in the ongoing maritime dispute will be seen as interference in China’s internal affairs, and could push the mainland and Taiwan even closer. As evidenced by the failed South Korea-Japan pact, nationalism can still trump traditional geopolitics in the region.
The Chinese government is highly sensitive to the possibility of the US developing a regional alliance to counter China’s growing influence. Although China has no strategic interest in initiating a conflict while its economic power continues to rise, the Chinese leadership cannot back down from territorial disputes for political and strategic reasons. China wants to be treated with the fear and respect that a superpower deserves, and some hawkish elements within the Middle Kingdom believe that a military show of force may be the only method of earning such respect.
The conflict over the Pinnacle Islands will in all likelihood remain a political war of words. Neither Japan nor China has enough to gain from an open clash to justify the enormous risks that such a conflict would entail. At the same time, neither government wants to appear weak in front of a historic enemy and current rival.
Japan’s slow-motion political crisis, the leadership transition in Beijing, and the upcoming election in the US nearly guarantee the perpetuation of a purely symbolic conflict. Global economic woes are an additional incentive to avoid unpredictable adventurism. Nevertheless, symbolic conflicts are an important window into real shifts in the balance of power. The violent currents in the East China Sea reflect a change in tides as China continues its rapid expansion of economic and military clout.
Notes:
1. Japan Weighs Buying Islands Also Claimed by China, NASDAQ, Jul 9, 2012.
2. China: Japan can’t purchase Diaoyu Islands, China Digital Times, Jul 9, 2012.
3. Japan plans ASEAN sea security summit, Japan Times, Jul 11, 2012.
4. US urged to respect China’s interests, China Daily, Jul 13, 2012.
5. Japan plans ASEAN sea security summit, Japan Times, Jul 11, 2012.
Brendan P O’Reilly is a China-based writer and educator from Seattle. He is author of The Transcendent Harmony.
(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)