

# Submission to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)

68 Pre-Sessional Working Group (8-12 March 2021)



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The World Uyghur Congress, established in April 2004, is an international organization that represents the collective interests of the Uyghur people in both China and abroad. The principle objective of the WUC is to promote democracy, human rights and freedom for the Uyghur people and to use peaceful, nonviolent and democratic means to determine their future.

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## I. Introduction

1. The present report provides information to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) ahead of the pre-sessional working group on 8-12 March 2021, with the view that the Committee members take into consideration the information and ask pointed questions regarding the treatment of the Uyghur population in China.
2. The World Uyghur Congress (WUC) is an international organization that represents the collective interests of the Uyghur people in both China and abroad. The principal objective of the WUC is to promote democracy, human and freedom for the Uyghur people and to use peaceful, nonviolent and democratic means to determine their future.

## II. Issues relating to the general provisions of the Covenant (arts. 1-5)

### Article 1 - Right to Self-Determination

WUC notes that the People's Republic of China (hereafter: China) has failed to ensure its people are "fully enjoying the right of self determination"<sup>1</sup>. In fact, the Chinese government has effectively criminalised any action perceived to be promoting the right to self-determination, often inculcating Uyghurs of false charges of "splittism", which is also frequently linked to "terrorism" charges.

The current political framework in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China (hereafter: Uyghur Region) does not allow Uyghurs to exercise their right to self-determination. Freedom of expression, movement and assembly are extremely restricted for Uyghurs. Authorities in the region exercise broad powers to suppress peaceful assembly, often labelling actions as terrorist activity. Police and security forces have indiscriminately fired into crowds of Uyghurs in recent years leaving many killed in Awat, Kucha and Luntai County.<sup>2</sup>

Strong limitations on freedom of assembly exist, particularly in light of state security laws. Chinese Criminal Law provides authorities with broad powers to arrest and sentence protest organizers. Article 291 provides for criminal sanctions that include up to five years in prison for the main organizer of crowds that "disturb order in a public place."<sup>3</sup>

Ilham Tohti, Uyghur economist, writer and professor, founded the website "Uighurbiz.net" to promote conciliation between Uyghurs and Chinese, and has advocated for Uyghurs to be represented and included in political and societal decision making processes. Tohti was arrested in January 2014 and WGAD found his deprivation of liberty to be arbitrary in April 2014.<sup>4</sup> He was tried from September 23-24, 2014, and convicted of "inciting separatism" and sentenced to life in prison. Tohti's lawyers could not meet him for six months after detention, and the defense team was not provided with complete evidence by the prosecutor, nor were their requested witnesses allowed to testify.<sup>5</sup> Seven of Tohti's students were sentenced from three to eight years in 2014 on separatism charges.

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<sup>1</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Concluding observations, People's Republic of China, 10 August, 2020, E/C.12/CHN - MAC/3, available at: [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2FC.12%2FCHN-MAC%2B3&Lang=en](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2FC.12%2FCHN-MAC%2B3&Lang=en).

<sup>2</sup> Hoshur, S. (2014, October 3). Innocent Bystander Shot by Police in Xinjiang's Bugur Violence, *Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service*. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/civilian-10032014170450.html>

<sup>3</sup> CECC (2016, October 6). Congressional Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2016, pp. 101, available at: <https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports/2016-annual-report>.

<sup>4</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at its sixty-ninth session (22 April–1 May 2014): No. 3/2014, China, 21 July 2014, A/HRC/WGAD/2014/3, available at: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/091/36/PDF/G1409136.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>5</sup> Congressional Executive Commission on China (2014, November 17). Lawyers Cite Procedural Violations, Await Decision on Appeal in Ilham Tohti Case. Retrieved from: <http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/lawyers-cite-procedural-violations-await-decision-on-appeal-in>

A Uyghur student, Abdulbasit Ablimit, was shot dead and two others wounded after he drove through a security checkpoint on his motorcycle in Aksu prefecture in April 2014.<sup>6</sup> Around 400 Uyghurs marched to the county office to protest and 70 of them were arrested and 17 were sentenced to between six months and seven years on unclear charges.

### **Suggested questions to the Committee to address to China:**

- *Please explain how the Chinese government is assuring that Uyghurs are sufficiently exercising their right to self-determination without being sentenced on “splittism” charges.*

## **Article 2, paragraph 2 – Non-discrimination**

In its 2014 Concluding Observations, the Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (hereafter: the Committee) urged China to “take all necessary measures to adopt comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation in line with article 2, paragraph 2, of the Covenant”<sup>7</sup>, particularly in western provinces towards ethnic minorities.

In its 2019 report, the Chinese government replied to the Committee highlighting that China had ratified several international human rights conventions “combating discrimination”.<sup>8</sup>

However, the WUC observes that in the last four years, the Chinese government has intensified its repression against the Uyghur people in the Uyghur Region. In late 2016, the then newly appointed CCP Secretary for the Uyghur Region, Chen Quanguo, introduced a grid-style system of total surveillance, which was first tested on the Tibetan people, in both the public and the private sphere. He also oversaw the establishment of political indoctrination camps all over the region, numbering in the thousands.

China has also formalized the discrimination and marginalization of the Uyghur people and Uyghur identity by passing repressive legislation. China completed deliberations over amendments to the Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA) that went into effect February 1, 2018, which extended greater powers to authorities in terms of oversight, as well as the ability of the government to shut down religious organizations that fall outside its approval.<sup>9</sup> The new Regulations focused on the use of religion as a vessel for extremist or separatist tendencies, added “extremism” as something to be guarded against in religious management, included a more significant focus on the spread of religious content online,<sup>10</sup> added greater focus to the role of religion in relation to schools,<sup>11</sup> and made approval for the Hajj pilgrimage reliant on the Islamic Association of China.

This period coincided with China’s launch of the “Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism” in 2014, which has led to widespread arrests and sentencing but also built on previous practices that linked religious practice directly to extremism and terrorism. The campaign accelerated dramatically in 2016 with the appointment of the new Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo to the Uyghur Region, who had served previously in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

Under the guidance of the newly appointed Party Secretary, the Chinese government passed the Regulation on “De-extremification,” effective in 2017. Its drafting was widely condemned by the

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<sup>6</sup> Wee, S. (2014, April 17). Chinese police shoot man dead at checkpoint in Xinjiang, *Reuters*. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang/chinese-police-shoot-man-dead-at-checkpoint-in-xinjiang-idUSBREA3G0BC20140417>

<sup>7</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Concluding observations, People’s Republic of China, 13 June, 2014, E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/53c77e524.html>

<sup>8</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Third Periodic Report, People’s Republic of China, 19 December, 2019, E/C.12/CHN/3, available at: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m6bJFqoFosMXZhzZH1V1cct2zVzrpeOK/view?ts=5fda9345>.

<sup>9</sup> Legal Affairs Office of the State Council (2016, September 8). Religious Affairs Regulations Draft Revisions (Deliberation Draft). Available at: <http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/religious-regulations/?lang=en>

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

international community for its excessively broad and vague language. Regional implementation guidelines for the XUAR were passed by the regional government on July 29, 2016. The guidelines refine the scope of the national legislation and make direct connections between what is broadly defined as “extremism” and terrorism. The legislation makes a direct link between religious practice, extremism, and terrorism.

The Regulation was amended on October 8, 2018, in an attempt to further justify the use of political indoctrination camps across the region, as highlighted in Article 33 calling for “[o]ccupational skills education and training centers and other education and transformation bodies” to carry out language, legal and occupational training, as well as “anti-extremist ideological education, and psychological and behavioral correction to promote thought transformation of trainees.”

On November 21, 2018, a group of UN experts sent a Joint Letter to the Chinese government calling for the repeal of the Regulation and expressed deep concern about the recurrent reference to extremism to “justify numerous measures limiting freedom of expression and belief, and inhibiting political dissent”. The experts also noted that the Regulation’s stated aim is to make “religion more Chinese and under law, and actively guide religions to become compatible with society.”<sup>12</sup> Their analysis emphasizes the numerous areas in which the regulations are incompatible with international law.

### Legal Rights

Basic legal rights, including the right to legal representation, a fair and prompt trial and due process are virtually non-existent for Uyghurs in China. There is no evidence suggesting that the countless Uyghurs arrested each year on charges relating to illegal religious practice, separatism, or extremism are provided any legal representation whatsoever.

Even in exceptional cases, like that of Ilham Tohti, lawyers have been prohibited from meeting with their clients for months.<sup>13</sup> The arrest and detention of suspects is often shrouded in secrecy with no legal requirement that authorities provide family members with information on cases. This becomes a particular problem in cases of enforced disappearances or when Uyghurs die in custody without investigation.

### Political Indoctrination Camps (Re-Education Centers)

The most blatant discriminatory practice is the internment of an estimated 1.8 - 3 millions of Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples in political indoctrination camps (also called ‘re-education’ centers), since 2017.<sup>14</sup> Those detained in the camps are detained indefinitely without charge, forced to undergo indoctrination classes, march shouting Communist Party slogans, provided very little food throughout the day, and housed in small rooms with many other inmates.<sup>15</sup> Detentions are extra-legal, with no legal representation allowed throughout the process of arrest and incarceration.

The targeted nature of the arbitrary detentions and the situation inside of the camps reveal that they function as part of a larger campaign of cultural assimilation and ideational oppression aimed at ‘stabilizing’ the Uyghur Region by eroding the unique Uyghur ethnicity. This has guided the Chinese government’s treatment of Uyghurs both inside and outside of the camps.

Reports of torture in the camps is widespread and an increasing number of Uyghurs have died in the camps, including prominent Uyghur scholar and religious figure Muhammad Salih Hajim,<sup>16</sup> who died in January 2018 at age 82; two young Uyghurs who died in custody under uncertain circumstances in

<sup>12</sup> Elina Steinerte, “OL CHN 21/2018,” UN Special Procedures, November 12, 2018, <https://srcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?aid=24182>.

<sup>13</sup> Human Rights Watch (2014, September 15). “China: Uighur Scholar’s Trial a Tragedy of Justice”. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/15/china-uighur-scholars-trial-tragedy-justice>.

<sup>14</sup> Zenz, A. (2020). The Karakax List: Dissecting the Anatomy of Beijing’s Internment Drive in Xinjiang, available at: <http://www.ipolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>.

<sup>15</sup> Special Correspondent (2018, February 28). A summer vacation in china’s Muslim gulag, Foreign Policy. Retrieved from: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/28/asummer-vacation-in-chinas-muslim-gulag/>.

<sup>16</sup> Hoshur, S. (2018, January 1). Uyghur Muslim Scholar Dies in Chinese Police Custody, Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-death-01292018180427.html>

December 2017<sup>17</sup>; a teenager who died under mysterious circumstances in March 2018<sup>18</sup>; another who was driven to suicide in February 2018<sup>19</sup>; and Ayhan Memet, the mother of WUC President Dolkun Isa, who reportedly died in a camp in May 2018 at the age of 78.<sup>20</sup> In June 2018, 26 people reportedly died in a camp in Hotan prefecture.<sup>21</sup>

### Discrimination Through Surveillance

The collection of biometric data, physical and biological information including DNA, blood type and facial structure, amongst others, has been an important component of the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to monitor, control and repress Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in the Uyghur Region. The mass collection of biometric data of Uyghurs in particular, often without their informed consent, has been used to discriminate and ethnically profile the Uyghur population and contribute to ongoing discrimination in the region.

Under the Strike Hard Campaign, the Chinese government has turned the Uyghur region into China's testing ground for repressive technologies and social control. More specifically, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP, 一体化联合作战平台) is one of the main systems that the police and other government officials use to communicate about their operations and systematically record personal data of Uyghur individuals. The mobile application allows law enforcement officials to access IJOP data, to add the information database and to exchange orders.

The central platform collects data, which is being used to chart the movement of people, from multiple sources, including CCTV cameras, police checkpoints, package delivery and access scanners at schools, residential areas or mosques etc.<sup>22</sup> At the same time, it sends out orders to police and other state agencies to follow up on individual cases within the same day.<sup>23</sup> With the help of the IJOP app, government officials collect individuals' data during home visits, on the streets, in "political education camps", during registration for travel abroad.<sup>24</sup>

Data collected through the IJOP app includes personal data but also car registration numbers, the individual's relationship with the persons living in the same household, political and religious affiliations and convictions as well as their bank information and activities abroad.<sup>25</sup> The app instructs officials to specifically investigate 36 "types" of persons; these include those released from detention or internment camps, those who do not socialize with neighbors, internal migrants, those who register with the authorities to travel abroad or are connected to persons abroad, those who live in a household that consumes "abnormal" amounts of electricity, etc.<sup>26</sup> Included in this list are, in most cases, the family members of persons fitting the profiles. According to Human Rights Watch's report these platforms use artificial intelligence to designate Uyghur individuals into these categories, perpetuating racial bias and prejudice built into the system. More recently, new reports have confirmed that Chinese technology companies are aiding the Chinese government in its repression against Uyghurs by providing the surveillance tools that help identify "Uyghur traits" and send out "Uyghur alarms".<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Hoshur, S. (2017, December 21). Two Uyghur Students Die in China's Custody Following Voluntary Return From Egypt, Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/students-12212017141002.html>.

<sup>18</sup>Hoshur, S. (2018, February 5). Threat of Re-Education Camp Drives Uyghur Who Failed Anthem Recitation to Suicide, Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/suicide-02052018165305.html>

<sup>19</sup>Hoshur, S. (2018, March 14). Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education Camp, Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/teenager-03142018154926.html>

<sup>20</sup>Hoshur, S. (2018, July 2). Uyghur Exile Group Leader's Mother Died in Xinjiang Detention Center, Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/mother-07022018164214.html>

<sup>21</sup>Hoshur, S. (2018, June 27). More Than Two Dozen Uyghurs From One Xinjiang County Perished in Re-Education Camps, Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deaths-06272018141605.html>.

<sup>22</sup>Human Rights Watch. (2019). "China's Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App". Human Rights Watch, pp. 16-17. Retrieved from: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass>.

<sup>23</sup>Human Rights Watch. (February 26, 2018). "China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region". Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region>.

<sup>24</sup>Human Rights Watch. (2019). "China's Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App". Supra n. 22 p. 22.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Zhong, R. (2020, December 16). As China Tracked Muslims, Alibaba Showed Customers How They Could Too, The New York Times. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/12/08/huawei-tested-ai-software-that-could-recognize-uyghur-minorities-alert-police-report-says/>; <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/technology/alibaba-china-facial-recognition-uyghurs.html>.

On July 7, 2020, a group of UN experts and Working Groups sent an official Joint Letter to the Chinese government, expressing their serious concerns regarding the use of extreme high-tech surveillance measures, including the use of artificial intelligence, and a system such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform as means to curb “terrorism” in accordance to the Regulation on De-Extrimification.<sup>28</sup>

#### **Suggested questions to the Committee to address to China:**

- *Please provide information on cases of Uyghurs arrested for showing signs of “extremism”. On what grounds are Uyghurs arrested on these charges? What kind of legal protections are afforded to Uyghurs arrested under the Regulation on De-Extrimification?*
- *What kind of religious expression is now legal in China? How many Uyghur families have been required to change their children’s names as a result of the name ban? How does the Chinese government justify its control over the selection of Uyghur imams in the Uyghur Region? Are Uyghurs able to attend mosques after they turn 18?*
- *How many mosques were destroyed since 2016? Are Uyghurs able to rebuild the mosques that were destroyed since then?*
- *How many Uyghurs and Turkic people are currently detained in ‘re-education’ camps?*
- *How does the Chinese government explain the disproportionate level of surveillance in the Uyghur Region? Please provide further information regarding the Integrated Joint Operations Platform and how its use complies with international human rights law.*

### **III. Issues relating to the specific provisions of the Covenant (arts. 6-15)**

#### **Article 7 - The right to just and favourable conditions of work**

In its 2014 Concluding Observations, the Committee had urged China to take necessary measures to ensure the “abolishment” of the Re-education through Labour system and any other parallel system of forced labour is implemented.

China in its 2019 report stated that “As of 24:00 on 28 December 2013, all persons in re-education through labour installations throughout the country had been released.”<sup>29</sup>

The WUC notes that the Chinese government has failed to eliminate the forced labour system, particularly with its “Xinjiang Aid” program. Evidence has shown that the breadth of the forced labour policy creates significant risk of the presence of forced labour at virtually any workplace, industrial or agricultural, in the Uyghur Region.<sup>30</sup> Beyond the textile and apparel production, forced labour is also widespread in cotton picking.<sup>31</sup>

A key feature of the government’s programme against Uyghurs and other Turkic and Muslim-majority peoples is the use of forced or compulsory labour – in or around internment camps, prisons, and workplaces across the region and the country. This system is maintained through an extensive digital

<sup>28</sup>Elina Steinerte, “AL CHN 14/2020”, UN Special Procedures, July 7, 2020, <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?id=25374>.

<sup>29</sup>UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Third Periodic Report, People’s Republic of China, para 65, 5 August 2020, E/C.12/CHN/3, available at [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2FC.12%2FCHN%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2FC.12%2FCHN%2FCO%2F2&Lang=en)  
<sup>30</sup>Amy Lehr, Addressing Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Toward a Shared Agenda, 30 July 2020, p3. Available online at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/addressing-forced-labor-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-toward-shared-agenda>.

<sup>31</sup>Zenz, Coercive Labor in Xinjiang: Labor Transfer and the Mobilization of Ethnic Minorities to Pick Cotton. <https://cqpolicy.org/briefs/coercive-labor-in-xinjiang-labor-transfer-and-the-mobilization-of-ethnic-minorities-to-pick-cotton/>.

and personal surveillance apparatus.<sup>32</sup> Although an exact number of how Uyghurs and other Turkic and/or Muslim peoples have been detained and are forced to work is unknown, the current estimate is as many as 1.8 million people.<sup>33</sup> According to official government documents “every year from 2014 to 2019 Xinjiang provided training sessions to an average of 1.29 million urban and rural workers, of which 451,400 were in southern Xinjiang”.<sup>34</sup>

Despite the significant obstacles to obtaining information, investigations have shown that the widespread use of forced labour as a means of social control of this policy creates significant risk of forced labour at all workplaces, industrial or agricultural, in the Uyghur Region.<sup>35</sup> The governmental documents are also transferring workers to other parts of China where they work in export factories under conditions that also strongly indicate forced labour.<sup>36</sup>

### Coerced labour of the rural poor in the ‘poverty alleviation’ programme

The Chinese government plans to have at least 1 million workers in the textile and garment sectors, with at least 650,000 coming from the Uyghur region by 2023.<sup>37</sup> These numbers would mean at least 5% of the Uyghur population in the region would be working in the textile and garment sector within three years.<sup>38</sup> To ensure that these individuals have the ‘skills’ required for the factory jobs, they are mandated to go through training. Although these centralised training centres are not directly part of the reeducation camps, the education, infrastructure, and setup is similar to that of those camps complete with high fences, police watchtowers and barbed wire.<sup>39</sup> Resistance to attend these training centres is seen as a sign of ‘extremism’ and can result in being sent to a reeducation camp.<sup>40</sup> According to interviews with ex-detainees, minority workers who are part of the ‘poverty alleviation’ plan were threatened with internment if they refused to work in a garment or textile factory.<sup>41</sup> These interviews also revealed that some of the rural poor who were forced to work in these garment and textile factories were also mandated to live in dormitories and were transported in the same buses as former detainees.<sup>42</sup>

### Forced labour of current and ex-detainees, including in internment camps

In a separate but parallel policy to China’s public poverty alleviation plan, the government has also enacted a public re-education policy that involves internment with some vocational training, indoctrination, and finally release to factories in nearby industrial parks or camp factories.<sup>43</sup> According to the GOC’s own documents, “After they [detainees] leave [the camps], the documents stipulate, every effort should be made to get them jobs.”<sup>44</sup> The exact number of former detainees who have been coerced into working in a factory is not known, but estimates based on interviews and government statements is at least 100,000 former detainees are forced to work in garment and textile factories.<sup>45</sup> Video reports from September 2020 from the Aksu province also reported on former

<sup>32</sup> “Zenz, Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts.”; Amy Lehr and Mariefaye Bechrakis, Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains, October 2019, p. 1, hereinafter “Lehr, Connecting the Dots.” Available online at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/connecting-dots-xinjiang-forced-labor-forced-assimilation-and-western-supply-chains>

<sup>33</sup> Adrian Zenz, Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign, Journal of Political Risk, Nov 2019, para 7, hereinafter “Zenz, Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts.” available online at: <http://www.jpolrisk.com/wash-brains-cleanse-hearts/>; 34 Xinhua Net. (17 September, 2020). “China Focus: China issues white paper on employment, labor rights in Xinjiang”. Retrieved from: [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/17/c\\_139375657.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/17/c_139375657.htm).

<sup>35</sup> Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy. (2020, 17 February). Inside China’s Push to Turn Muslim Minorities Into an Army of Workers, NY Times. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslims-labor.html>.

<sup>36</sup> Fifield, A. (2020, 29 February). China compels Uighurs to work in shoe factory that supplies Nike, Washington Post. Retrieved from: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/china-compels-uighurs-to-work-in-shoe-factory-that-supplies-nike/2020/02/28/ebdd5f4-57b2-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-compels-uighurs-to-work-in-shoe-factory-that-supplies-nike/2020/02/28/ebdd5f4-57b2-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057_story.html).

<sup>37</sup> Lehr, Connecting the Dots, supra n. 11 at p. 5.; Adrian Zenz, Beyond the Camps: Beijing’s Grand Scheme of Forced Labor, Poverty Alleviation and Social Control in Xinjiang,” July 2019 at 13-14, hereinafter “Zenz, Beyond the Camps.” Available at: <https://www.cecc.gov/events/hearings/forced-labor-mass-internment-and-social-control-in-xinjiang>.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Zenz, Beyond the Camps, supra n.13.

<sup>40</sup> Lehr, Connecting the Dots, supra n.13.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* at 7.

<sup>42</sup> Zenz, Beyond the Camps, supra n.13.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> The Associated Press, (2019, November 25). Secret documents reveal how China mass detention camps work. Retrieved from:

<https://apnews.com/article/4ab0b341a4ec4e6484232ec47ea5c47>

<sup>45</sup> Lehr, (2020, February 17). Connecting the Dots, supra n. 11 at p. 8; Deutsche Welle, Exclusive: China’s systematic tracking, arrests of Uighurs exposed in new Xinjiang leak, Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/exclusive-chinas-systematic-tracking-arrests-of-uighurs-exposed-in-new-xinjiang-leak/a-52397824> supra, n. 45 (“In dozens of cases, DW has found reference to a system of forced labor in factories. One such case of prolonged internment at a factory involves a man detained in May 2018 for contacting his brother, who had fled to Turkey.”) According to the document, the detainee therefore “poses a certain level of danger to society.” The recommendation by the “community” is for him to “remain in a factory in the re-education camps.”).

detainees being forced to work in the textile sector.<sup>46</sup> The government of Kashgar (a prefecture in the Uyghur Region), stated that it would send 100,000 former detainees who had completed ‘vocational training’ (time in a detention center) to work in factories, which would be 20% of the Uyghur population of Kashgar.<sup>47</sup>

WUC notes that in November 2020, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed its grave concern regarding reports of arbitrary detention in extrajudicial detention facilities operating as forced labour camps, an considered unsatisfactory, the Chinese government’s response to their prior recommendations that China immediately release Uyghurs who are detained against their will.<sup>48</sup>

Given this, the Chinese government’s assurances that “all persons in re-education through labor installations throughout the country had been released” cannot be considered plausible.

### **Suggested questions to the Committee to address to China:**

- *Please explain the steps taken to meet the obligations under the ILO Employment Convention, 1964 (No.122).*
- *Please provide information on what criteria is used to determine whether Uyghurs choose to work freely and undergo "vocational skills training" programs? Please explain how the transfer of thousands of Uyghurs to other provinces in China to factories where they are subjected to coerced labour fulfills China’s obligations under the ILO Convention.*
- *Please provide detailed information about the labour of prisoners and internees in internment camps.*
- *Please provide detailed information on the existing regulations that allow independent auditing in factories with Uyghur workers.*

## **Article 10 - Protection of the family, mothers and children**

In its 2014 concluding observations, the Committee has urged China to “prevent and criminalise” the use of coercive measures, such as forced sterilisation and forced abortion.

In its 2019 State report, China has stressed that it opposes “any form of coercion in family planning work, including the compulsory implementation of contraceptive measures and the forced artificial termination of pregnancies.”<sup>49</sup>

The WUC considers that with a policy of forced sterilisation and population control targeting Uyghur women in the Uyghur Region, the Chinese government has failed to prevent the use of coercive measures in the implementation of the birth control policy, and protect both women and children.

This policy appears to aim to significantly diminish the Uyghur population and is taking place in the context of the mass arbitrary detention of Uyghur in internment camps, use of Uyghur detainees in forced labour programs, attempts to forcibly assimilate and indoctrination ethnic Uyghurs and a denial of the Uyghur people’s most basic rights and freedoms.

The targeted nature of this campaign of mass sterilisation and population control and intent to decrease the Uyghur population fits the accepted definition of a genocide under Article 2 (d) of the

<sup>46</sup> Hoshur, S. (2020, October 1). Uyghur Women Released From Camps Work Long Hours For Low Pay in Forced Labor Scheme, Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/labor-10012020174034.html>.

<sup>47</sup> Lehr, (2020, February 17). Connecting the Dots, supra n. 11 at p. 8; Deutsche Welle, “Exclusive: China’s systematic tracking, arrests of Uighurs exposed in new Xinjiang leak”, Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/exclusive-chinas-systematic-tracking-arrests-of-uighurs-exposed-in-new-xinjiang-leak/a-52397824>.

<sup>48</sup> Marc Bossuyt, “CERD/101st session /FU/MK/ks”, UN Human Rights Office of the High commissioner, November 24, 2020, [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/CHN/INT\\_CERD\\_FUL\\_CHN\\_43684\\_E.pdf](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/CHN/INT_CERD_FUL_CHN_43684_E.pdf).

<sup>49</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Third Periodic Report, People’s Republic of China, supra n.29, para 26.

UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and in article 6 (d) of the Statute of Rome.

Official CCP documents “bluntly mandate that birth control violations are punishable by extrajudicial internment in “training” camps”<sup>50</sup>, confirming evidence from the leaked “Karakax List” document.<sup>51</sup> Further documents from 2019 reveal plans for a campaign of mass female sterilisation in rural Uyghur regions, targeting between 14 (in Guma County)<sup>52</sup> and 34 percent (in Hotan City) of all women of childbearing age<sup>53</sup> with sufficient funding to perform hundreds of thousands of ‘tubal ligation sterilization procedures’ in 2019 and 2020.<sup>54</sup>

It further states that by 2019, Chinese authorities planned to subject at least 80% of women of childbearing age in southern Xinjiang to birth prevention surgeries. In 2018, 80% of all new IUD (a contraceptive device) placements in China were performed in Xinjiang, despite the fact that it makes up only 1.8% of China’s population. The report states that the project was implemented in all of southern Xinjiang, where most of the Uyghur population resides, and continued in 2020 with increased funding.<sup>55</sup>

### **Suggested questions to the Committee to address to China:**

- *Please provide credible evidence that the Uyghur women are freely choosing contraceptive measures and have their own say in decisions related to their body.*
- *Please provide detailed information on the family planning policies that are implemented in the Uyghur Region, as opposed to the other regions.*

## **Article 12 - The Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health**

Several camp survivors have shared their personal experiences during their arbitrary detention in internment camps in the Uyghur Region. They have all described the poor conditions in which they were detained.<sup>56</sup>

Inmates were not allowed to use water often, unless it was for medication, otherwise they would be reprimanded for performing ablution. There was no air conditioning during the hot summer days. Inmates did not have any beds or mattresses to sleep on and were handcuffed when they were sleeping and eating.

Gulbahar Jalilova has testified that the sanitation and hygiene were very poor: inmates were not given any shampoo to wash their hair. As a result of this, Jalilova recalls many women developed head lice infections, and would then have their heads shaved. A lot of women had health issues due to the poor hygiene inside the room. There were no medical facilities; instead, inmates had their blood pressure measured every week by doctors who would send them to hospitals if needed. This was a weekly routine done directly from the inmates’ room -sticking out their arms through the door-, by exclusively Han Chinese doctors. Every two months, the inmates were transferred to the hospital for a brief health check-up of heart, lungs and liver. If an inmate was severely ill, fainted, felt acute body pain, or experienced heart burns, only then would she be transferred to the hospital.

<sup>50</sup>Zenz, A. (2020). Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: The CCP’s Control to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang, available at: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Sterilizations-IUDs-and-Mandatory-Birth-Control-FINAL-27June.pdf?x35627>.

<sup>51</sup>Zenz, A. (2020). The Karakax List: Dissecting the Anatomy of Beijing’s Internment Drive in Xinjiang, Vol. 8, No. 2, available at: [https://www.ipolrisk.com/karakax/?\\_cf\\_chl\\_jschl\\_tk\\_=975d7ed5b13ff4ee7fd2e99dec601dfb11829b9-1594306388-0-ASTBHFUTrPB2nAnPVI7IzJMeIYxLCvgw8R3yEwXA0CDYHN1wxlg1pdFjwPIBHHiQQifvQ-cGixvAE8haKpFK6NwWmxi8KQfxFGPtpwofBj\\_P4nAnAwOQf-HQJwJGiyhQixoT2aF4K4ifHgfAdZ8XgKm6ccd7CYMgCqQL690zZhouZz8\\_itn-K96fDzWxNlW95C1WEiAnBMCVgo9miqz3B1r4UebPXD-IUNNdA6LOBvZ\\_lh-Ra7wZ\\_PGAsDOEcFfo7TwKVt9iIPI1hv4ozJ3HTDLmftk40Ax-N9Jhw\\_](https://www.ipolrisk.com/karakax/?_cf_chl_jschl_tk_=975d7ed5b13ff4ee7fd2e99dec601dfb11829b9-1594306388-0-ASTBHFUTrPB2nAnPVI7IzJMeIYxLCvgw8R3yEwXA0CDYHN1wxlg1pdFjwPIBHHiQQifvQ-cGixvAE8haKpFK6NwWmxi8KQfxFGPtpwofBj_P4nAnAwOQf-HQJwJGiyhQixoT2aF4K4ifHgfAdZ8XgKm6ccd7CYMgCqQL690zZhouZz8_itn-K96fDzWxNlW95C1WEiAnBMCVgo9miqz3B1r4UebPXD-IUNNdA6LOBvZ_lh-Ra7wZ_PGAsDOEcFfo7TwKVt9iIPI1hv4ozJ3HTDLmftk40Ax-N9Jhw_)

<sup>52</sup> People’s Republic of China. (2019, October 23). Hotan City Planning Bureau. Retrieved from: <https://archive.fo/Z2gke>.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Zenz, A. (2020). Sterilizations, IUDs, and Mandatory Birth Control: the CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birthrates in Xinjiang, supra, n. 24, available at: <https://jamestown.org/program/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birth-rates-in-xinjiang/>

<sup>56</sup> Safeguard defenders (2020, January 6). We Could Only Comfort Her With Our Eyes. Safeguard Defenders. Retrieved from: <https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/we-could-only-comfort-her-our-eyes>.

Gulbahar Jalilova who spent 15 months inside these camps has given first-hand account of the conditions inside. Gulbahar recounts the ill treatment, she and other detainees received, including physical and mental torture, gender-based and sexual violence, such as forced sterilisation<sup>57</sup>. Detainees were given unidentified substances and pills, which later led women to lose their menstrual cycles.<sup>58</sup> During interrogations, the guards would often use the tiger chair and weights, and beat the detainees if they weren't cooperating.<sup>59</sup> Detainees were cut off from any contact with the outside world, including with family members.<sup>60</sup> Other former camp detainees shared similar experiences of abuses inside the camps.<sup>61</sup>

Other camp survivors have publicly testified that they were subjected to birth prevention measures while detained in the internment camps and witnessed this being perpetrated against other Uyghur women<sup>62</sup>. All of the former detainees recounted that while in detention, they were forced to ingest pills, a white liquid or received injections, which made them numb and stopped the periods of female detainees.<sup>63</sup> Some of the survivors testified that female detainees experienced heavy bleeding and other serious health problems and receiving the pills, liquid or injections. All of the detainees had a black bag placed over their head at the time of the arrest and were subjected to medical examinations and had blood drawn without their consent.<sup>64</sup>

### **Suggested questions to the Committee to address to China:**

- *What steps has your government taken to amend the CPL to conform to the definition provided by the Convention Against Torture?*
- *How has your government taken steps to prevent torture relating to cases related to national security?*
- *Please provide information on the conditions of detention of the detained individuals? Under what circumstances did these Uyghurs die in the camps?*
- *Please provide evidence that detainees are provided with adequate medical treatment and the necessary hygienic and health products. If not, please explain why.*

### **Article 13 - The Right to Education**

In its 2014 concluding observations, the Committee raised concerns on the restrictions of receiving education in the Uyghur language in the Uyghur Region.<sup>65</sup> In its 2019 report to the Committee, China highlighted the success of ‘bilingual education’.<sup>66</sup>

WUC notes that the ‘bilingual education’ is failing to address the problem that Uyghurs do not benefit from this system, and are not given the opportunity to receive education in their mother tongue.

Discriminatory education policies targeting Uyghurs are widespread. Curriculum for Uyghurs has deemphasized or eliminated teaching on language, culture and religion, and language policies in education continue to erode the Uyghur language from a young age.<sup>67</sup> Teaching and using the Uyghur language has been dramatically weakened, largely through the ‘bilingual education’ program, initiated

<sup>57</sup><https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-01-08/uyghur-woman-details-life-inside-chinese-re-education-camp/10697044>

<sup>58</sup> Id

<sup>59</sup><https://news.sky.com/story/the-missing-uyghurs-exiled-families-haunted-by-hell-of-chinese-prison-camps-12033475>

<sup>60</sup> Id.

<sup>61</sup> <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/30/asia/xinjiang-sterilization-women-human-rights-intl-hnk/index.html>.

<sup>62</sup> Congressional Executive Commission on China (2018, November 28). Hearing: The Communist Party's Crackdown on Religion in China: Testimony of Mihrigul Tursun. Retrieved from: [https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/REVISED\\_Mihrigul%20Tursun%20Testimony%20for%20CECC%20Hearing%2011-28-18\\_0.pdf](https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/REVISED_Mihrigul%20Tursun%20Testimony%20for%20CECC%20Hearing%2011-28-18_0.pdf)

<sup>63</sup> International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (2019, December 9). A Voice for Xinjiang Detainees. ICIJ. Retrieved from: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJNYK6me8Bk&ab\\_channel=ICIJ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJNYK6me8Bk&ab_channel=ICIJ).

<sup>64</sup> Hoja, G. (2019, October 30). Female Detainees at Xinjiang Internment Camps Face Sterilization, Sexual Abuse: Camp Survivor. RFA. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/abuse-10302019142433.html>.

<sup>65</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Concluding observations, People's Republic of China. Supra n.7. Para 36.

<sup>66</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Third Periodic Report, People's Republic of China. Supra n.29, para 141.

<sup>67</sup> Gupta, S. & Veena, R. (2016). Bilingual Education in Xinjiang in the Post-2009 Period. China Report, 52(4), pp. 306–323.

in the mid-1980s and intensified in the early 2000s.<sup>68</sup> Substantial increases in funding for the program has led to comparable increases in enrollment. In 1995, 5,533 students were enrolled in ‘bilingual’ schools, by 2007 it was 294,000, by 2010, 994,300 and by 2012, 1,410,000. The regional government has now set a target of 2,600,000 students in the Uyghur region by 2020 which constitutes nearly all non-Chinese students.<sup>69</sup>

In practice, ‘bilingual education’ in the Uyghur Region stands as a policy of transitioning Uyghur students at all levels of education to speak and learn only in Chinese. To facilitate this, there has been a substantial influx of Han Chinese teachers incentivized to relocate to the region to work, while Uyghur teachers are fired or are not able to find jobs in education. A directive was issued by the Education Department of Hotan prefecture in late June 2017 outlawing the use of the Uyghur language for students at all education levels from primary to secondary school.<sup>70</sup> China has built a system of ‘bilingual education’ that has substantially eroded the use of the Uyghur language in schools and in public life.<sup>71</sup>

In January 2018, UN independent experts issued a communication expressing their concern over the directive on bilingual education issued by Hotan’s Education Department. The experts have raised concerns about the prohibition of receiving education in one’s native language, as it represents ‘unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions to the right to freedom of expression’.<sup>72</sup>

### **Suggested questions to the Committee to address to China:**

- *How is your government supporting minority language rights for Uyghurs in the Uyghur Region considering protections in the Constitution and in Regional Autonomy Laws?*
- *What kind of support do Uyghur language teachers receive from the Xinjiang Education Department? What policies are in place to ensure that Uyghur language teachers continue to be employed?*

## **Article 15 – Cultural Rights**

### Destruction of Cultural and Religious Sites

In its 2014 concluding observations, the Committee urged China to take adequate measures to protect cultural diversity and cultural heritage of “ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities”.<sup>73</sup> In its 2009 general comment No.21, the Committee stated that “Cultural heritage must be preserved, developed, enriched and transmitted to future generations as a record of human experience and aspirations” and that these obligations include “the care, preservation and restoration of historical sites, monuments, works of art and literary works, among others.”<sup>74</sup>

In its State report, China claims it is protecting cultural heritage by stating that 15 projects have been chosen to be included in the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>68</sup>Schluessel, E. (2007, September 10). ‘Bilingual’ education and discontent in Xinjiang, Central Asian Survey. Retrieved from:

<https://sunchina.com/2017/06/16/where-does-chinese-islamophobia-come-from/>.

<sup>69</sup> Uyghur Human Rights Project (2015), ‘Uyghur Voices on Education: Chinese Assimilative ‘Bilingual Education’ Policy in East Turkistan’, available at: <https://uhrp.org/press-release/uhrp-releases-report-bilingual-education-east-turkestan-uyghur-voices-education.html>.

<sup>70</sup>Sulaiman, E.. (2017, July 28). China Bans Uyghur Language in Schools in Key Xinjiang Prefecture, Radio Free Asia Uyghur Service. Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/language-07282017143037.html>.

<sup>71</sup> Uyghur Human Rights Project (2015). Uyghur Voices on Education: China’s Assimilative ‘Bilingual Education’ Policy in East Turkistan, p. 3, available at: <http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/pdf/Uyghur-Voices-on-Education.pdf>.

<sup>72</sup> Special Rapporteur, 12 January 2018, OL CHN1/2018, available at: <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23557>.

<sup>73</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Concluding observations, People’s Republic of China. Supra n.7. Para 36.

<sup>74</sup>UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right: General Comment No 21. Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1a of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), para. 50 (a). Retrieved from: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ed35bae2.html>.

<sup>75</sup>UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Third Periodic Report, People’s Republic of China. Supra n.29, para 26.

However, WUC observes that sites of cultural importance like the old town of Kashgar with narrow streets and ancient mudbrick houses, for example, were nearly completely destroyed between 2009 and 2011 to “facilitate maximum security and surveillance of the local population”.<sup>76</sup>

In response, the European Parliament passed a resolution in 2011, urging China “to adhere to its constitutional obligations by adequately supporting Kashgar and the Uyghur Region's cultural traditions, which are strongly influenced by the Uyghur identity”.<sup>77</sup> Chinese policy in 2019 built on some of these more moderate efforts in the past to slowly push the Uyghur population away from culture and religion, but have morphed into a sharply aggressive push since 2016 to rid Uyghurs of these core values and expressions.

Large-scale mosques destruction began in late 2016 under the scope of a “Mosque Rectification” program, where Chinese authorities have conducted a systematic campaign to demolish or desecrate places of worship. Radio Free Asia indicated that during the official campaign in the fall of 2016, around 5000 mosques were destroyed.<sup>78</sup> According to a Bitter Winter field correspondent, speaking about Kumul prefecture (Chinese: Hami), “a staff member in the local United Front Work Department informed him that out of over 800 mosques in this region, more than 200 were demolished in 2017 with over 500 planned to be demolished in 2018”.<sup>79</sup>

According to a survey of 100 religious sites conducted by The Guardian and Bellingcat, 31 mosques and two shrines were damaged between 2016 and 2018, with 15 completely demolished.<sup>80</sup>

Beyond large public structures, the campaign has also been extended to Uyghur homes, building on more invasive programs aimed at infiltrating personal lives and private freedoms.<sup>81</sup> In July 2019, Radio Free Asia reported that Muslim residents have been ordered to remove architectural features from their private homes called mihrabs, which are domed niches that denote the direction in which Mecca lies. The measure was justified as a means of fighting ‘religious extremism’.<sup>82</sup> In January 2020, Radio Free Asia reported that the authorities have been promoting the “Three News” campaign to force Uyghurs to abandon their traditional decors inside their homes, including mihrabs, or ornate dome niches built into a wall to indicate the direction to Mecca.<sup>83</sup>

### **Suggested questions to the Committee to address to China:**

- *What official process is in place to ensure that appropriate consultations take place between local communities and government officials who wish to remove, alter or acquire historical buildings and other cultural relics?*
- *Please explain how the government is implementing the relevant laws regarding the conservation of cultural heritage sites in ancient cities, such as Kashgar, in reference to the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, the Property Rights Law (Article 42), and the Regulation on the Protection of Famous Historical and Cultural Cities, Towns and Villages (Article 28).*

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<sup>76</sup> Harris, R. (2019, April 7). Bulldozing mosques: the latest tactic in China's war against Uighur culture, The Guardian. Retrieved from:

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/07/bulldozing-mosques-china-war-uyghur-culture-xinjiang>

<sup>77</sup> European Parliament. (March 10, 2011). Text adopted, P7\_TA(2011)0100. Retrieved from:

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0100&language=EN&ring=P7-RC-2011-0168>

<sup>78</sup> Hoshur, S. (2016, December 19). Under the Guise of Public Safety, China Demolishes Thousands of Mosques, Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from:

<https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/under-the-guise-of-public-safety-12192016140127.html>

<sup>79</sup> Direct reports from China. (2018, June 19). Chinese Government Demolishes Mosques in Xinjiang, Bitter Winter. Retrieved from:

<https://bitterwinter.org/chinese-government-demolishes-mosques-in-xinjiang/>

<sup>80</sup> Sintash, B. & UHRP. (2019). Demolishing Faith: The Destruction and Desecration of Uyghur Mosques and Shrines, p. 2, available at :

[https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP\\_report\\_Demolishing\\_Faith.pdf](https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_report_Demolishing_Faith.pdf)

<sup>81</sup> Human Rights Watch (2018, May 13). China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region, Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from:

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region>

<sup>82</sup> Hoshur, S. (2019, July 10). Uyghurs Ordered to Destroy Muslim Architecture Deemed ‘Extremist’ by Authorities, Radio Free Asia.

Retrieved from: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/architecture-07102019140830.html>

<sup>83</sup> Hoshur, S. (2020, January, 9). Uyghurs in Xinjiang Ordered to Replace Traditional Décor with Sinicized Furniture. Radio Free Asia. Retrieved from:

<https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/furniture-01092020165529.html>