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Issue 14: China’s “Anti-Terror” Law

Issue 14: China’s “Anti-Terror” Law

World Uyghur Congress, 29 May 2018

China followed through on many of its promises to “crackdown” on terrorism—particularly in East Turkestan in 2016. Scholars reported as early as 2005 and 2006 that China was indeed developing a framework for a counter-terror law, but it wasn’t until 2014 that the government began to slowly reveal its intentions of drafting full-fledged legislation on the subject—likely a direct response to an increase in violent incidents in the region that year as a first draft was published on November 3.

The first draft was roundly criticized for its content, particularly in its broad definition of terrorism itself, which “defines ‘terrorism’ in broad terms to include ‘thought, speech or behavior’ that is ‘subversive’ or even that which seeks to ‘influence national policy making.’” The language of “thought” was subsequently removed from the definition, but scholar Zhou Zunyou argued that the continued inclusion of “zhuzhang”, meaning “advocacy”, can still be broadly defined in terms of thought. After some changes in the subsequent year, the Counter–Terrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China was officially passed by the National People’s Congress on 27 December 2015.

The version of the law that entered into force on 1 January 2016 has done little to appease its opponents. Major issues for the Uyghurs in particular include the excessively broad definition of “terrorism” and “terrorist activities” as well as lack of transparency and fair trial rights.

According to Article 3, terrorism refers to, “propositions and actions that create social panic, endanger public safety, violate person and property, or coerce national organs or international organizations, through methods such violence, destruction, intimidation, so as to achieve their political, ideological, or other objectives.”[v] Such a lengthy and broadly defined term is certainly not an oversight by its drafters, but a purposeful move to ensure the state is provided sweeping jurisdiction to apply the law how it pleases.

The definition of “terrorist activities” goes even further to include a number of worrying clauses. Article 3(2) includes, “compelling others to wear or bear clothes or symbols that advocate terrorism in a public place” as terrorist activities, which causes great concern in terms of China’s continued conflation of religious extremism and terrorism. Uyghurs have already been jailed and convicted on charges related to public displays of Islam or Uyghur culture more generally and under this provision, the wearing of traditionally Uyghur dress or symbols may be conflated with terrorism and land the bearer in prison on terror charges.

In addition, Article 3(4) implicates those who offer “other support, assistance or facilitation for terrorist organizations,” which presents a vaguely worded phrase that may allow for generous interpretation. In September 2015, it was reported that during a counter-terror operation in Aksu prefecture’s Bay county, 11 of the 28 people killed by security forces during a raid were women and children.[vii] In contrast, the entire group was described as a “terrorist gang” by state media.

The new law provides maximum authority for security forces to act with impunity. In practice, China has effectively granted immunity to its security forces to deal with Uyghur dissent and protest critical of repressive rule in East Turkestan. Additionally, the lack of oversight of state security will ensure that the use of excessive force may continue unabated.