Carrot and Stick – China’s Formula In Tibet And Xinjiang
Originally published by Phayul, 15 March 2010
Soon after the opening session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), President Hu Jintao met some deputies from Tibet. He told them: “Development and stability in Tibet are two top tasks that demand unremitting efforts.”
A few days earlier, an article entitled “China Insider Sees Revolution Brewing” written by John Garnaut, had appeared in The Guardian. “China’s top expert on social unrest has warned that hardline security policies are taking the country to the brink of revolutionary turmoil”, it said.
The fact is that several voices from inside the party have started to raise the issue of ‘stability’ (whether in Tibet or China); and these are not voices of dissidents or human rights activists, but of people like Professor Yu Jianrong, the Director of Social Issues Research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Rural Affairs in Beijing; Prof. Yu is a top advisor of the Chinese government. Conducting surveys and interviewing hundreds of stakeholders, he has gone into the alarming situation in great depth.
In a speech in December, Yu said: “The deepening social fractures were caused by the Communist Party’s obsession with preserving its monopoly on power through state violence and ideology.”
Prof Yu cites statistics: recorded incidents of ‘mass unrest’ grew from 8,709 in 1993 to more than 90,000 in each of the past three years. “More and more evidence shows that the situation is getting more and more tense, more and more serious”, commented Yu.
Being a part of the system, Prof Yu has a nice formula: “Disaster can be averted only if ‘interest groups’ are capable of making a rational compromise to subordinate themselves to the Constitution”. For the past thirty years, the sole objective of these ‘interest groups’ (including the senior members of the Politburo) has been to remain in power. A report on the March/April 2008 riots in Tibet, prepared by another Chinese think-tank, Open Constitution Initiative, arrived at the same conclusion.
The question before President Hu Jintao and his colleagues is how to handle the deep resentment of the masses, especially in Xinjiang and Tibet. In these areas, policies oscillate between ‘strike hard’ and ‘stabilizing’ campaigns, in other words, between the stick and the carrot.
Hu’s favourite slogans are bu zheteng (‘stability’ and ‘harmonious society’). Though the government is going ahead with its plan to impose stability, many believe that ‘forced’ harmony can only lead to social disaster, particularly in the ‘minorities’ areas, like Tibet and Xinjiang.
Presenting his government’s work report to the annual session of the NPC, Premier Wen Jiabao announced: “We will focus on formulating and implementing policies for economic and social development in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Tibetan ethnic areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces.” Interestingly, it was the first time that a senior leader enlarged the geographical definition of Tibet to include these regions which have traditionally been part of Tibet, but had been incorporated in the mainland’s provinces in the 1960s. It is only after the 2008 unrest in these areas that Beijing realized that there was only ‘one Tibet’.
Wen also affirmed that “the policies would be ‘very forceful’ and target a broad sphere from infrastructure facility, fixed assets investment, opening-up and economic reform, social development and stability, and people’s livelihood.”
A few days earlier, The Tibet Daily announced that the Tibetan local government would spend 1.26 billion US dollars on road construction during this financial year. “Meanwhile, the regional government will also work to make sure that all the counties will have had access to roads by the end of this year”. This is not a small amount. President Hu announced further that by 2020 the per capita net income of farmers and nomads in Tibet should be close to the national level. “Tibet’s capacity to provide public service and infrastructure must also be comparable to the nation’s average by 2020, through more government investment and better management.”
The chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Jia Qinglin, confirmed that the CPPCC “will conscientiously implement the guiding principles of the central leadership’s Fifth Forum on Tibet Work (held in January 2010 to decide Beijing’s Tibet policy for the years to come), and strive to achieve a leapfrog development and lasting stability.”
These are the carrots.
What Mr Hu does not seem to realize is that a ‘harmonious society’ has to grow from within, it can’t be imposed by force from outside; it is a fact that the party is today unable to chart a strategy to meet the challenges posed by the angry Tibetans. A case in point is the appointment of Gyaltsen Norbu, the CCP-chosen Panchen Lama as a delegate to the CPPCC. Desperate to win over the Tibetans, Beijing projects its own Panchen Lama as a possible successor of the Dalai Lama. But this tactical move can only create more resentment among the Tibetan masses. Had Beijing freed Gedun Nyima, the Panchen Lama recognized by the Dalai Lama, it may have gone a long way to convince the ‘masses’ that the Chinese government was sincere in its approach towards the Tibetan ‘nationality’. This has not been the case.
Incidentally, Padma Choling, Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), for the first time during a recent press conference admitted that Gedun Nyima lives with his family somewhere in Tibet: “As far as I know, his family and he are now living a very good life in Tibet… he and his family are reluctant to be disturbed.”
At the same time, the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign is going on in full swing in Tibet. After the small carrot, it is the hard stick.
The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), a Tibetan NGO based in Dharamsala, believes that since the launch of the latest ‘Strike Hard’ campaign in the TAR on 2 March, the Chinese security forces have detained some 500 Tibetans in Lhasa alone. TCHRD quotes the official Chinese portal www.chinatibet.com. “During the campaign, the Lhasa City Public Security Bureau (PSB) Police Brigade raided a total of 4,115 rented accommodations, thoroughly checked 60 high prone areas where crime is concentrated, gathering areas for floating population, places with complex social order and iniquity, carried out comprehensive checks on a total of 7,347 non-permanent residents of the city, raided more than 70 guest houses, internet cafes, entertainment centres and bars; and detained a total of 435 people. Seven persons were arrested for theft and burglary, three for stealing motor bikes, one for duping, three others as suspected burglary accomplices.” What about the others?
The next day, the PSB is said to have mobilized 1,134 of its personnel and 300 other security forces to raid 2,787 rented accommodations.
The movement of monks from three major monasteries around Lhasa ~ Drepung, Gaden and Sera ~ was restricted for an indefinite period. Associated Press reported: “The troops with automatic rifles patrolling the Tibetan quarter of the capital of Chinese-controlled Tibet are as ever-present as Buddhist pilgrims. Two years after Lhasa erupted in a riot that set off anti-government protests across Tibetan areas of China, heavy security is the new norm. Helmeted paramilitary police stand guard behind spiked barriers at some street corners. Men on rooftops train binoculars on the square and streets in the Barkhor, the heart of the old city that surrounds a holy temple.”
In such circumstances, can the Beijing leadership establish a Harmonious Society? Difficult.